Short presentation: The integrated analysis of electoral, socio-economic and geographic data brings new light in understanding deep social cleavages and their political translation in post-communist Romania. The impact of the social characteristics of the voters, the systemic factors of the political system and territory on the electoral behaviour of Romanians is observed and analysed during the first 18 years of democratic rule. One of the compelling conclusions is that democracy is a learning process. But in 18 years of democracy, the majority of voters have given up the democracy school. They do not turn out to vote as they are profoundly disengaged with politics. Voters, political system and even geography are changing. Although geography is stable throughout this book, joining the European Union is expected to have a significant further impact on electoral behaviour.

• “In cyberspace, the time between execution and effect can be milliseconds. Nonetheless, the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop remains a valid construct for examining the decision cycle in cyberspace. Ongoing operations can be considered those operations that span past the phases of warfare.” (page 30)
• “Even for ongoing operations, planning at the strategic level is imperative because cyberspace operations can create effects simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels across multiple domains.” (p. 30)
• “Cyberspace operations can enable creation of many effects that formerly required physical attack to accomplish.” (p. 30)
• “Cyberspace operations normally are planned as part of major operations and campaigns, homeland operations, crisis response, and limited contingency operations.” (p. 31)
• In order to accomplish this assessment process within the interrelated and complex nature of many cyberspace operations, operational-level cyberspace planners and analysts should develop an intimate understanding of the linkage between cyberspace and the supported mission or operation. This requires direct feedback from those closest to observing the intended effects, such as the Airmen executing cyberenabled Air Force missions or the warfighters in theater, in order to assess the level of cyberspace performance and effectiveness. For example, the assessment of cyberspace operational effects in support of influence operations requires an in-depth understanding of the warfighter’s desired impact on behavior and the ability to measure any resulting behavioral changes. (p. 33)

See the whole AP story on KSL website.
James Lewis – a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies – declared that the government still hasn’t decided whether offensive cyberwarfare is the province of the military or intelligence agencies.
Overall U.S. military cyberwarfare operations will be the job of the U.S. Cyber Command, which began limited operations in May. It will have components from the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines.
Responsibility for civilian and government cybersecurity is less clear. Congress is debating between giving more power to the Homeland Security Department or the White House and the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

Homeland Security and the National Security Agency announced this month they would cooperate to strengthen the nation’s cybersecurity.